ABSTRACT In this paper, we use hyper-network methods to identify the critical elements of a cyber-physical system (CPS) under data attack according to IEC 61850. The related works are introduced first, such as cyber offensive tools, procedures, and data attack models. Some definitions of a hypergraph are presented. Then, considering the functional attributes of logical nodes, a hyper-network model of substation auto system (SAS) is proposed using hyper-graph theory. On this basis, a CPS model that takes into account the functional influence after data attack is established. In addition, combined with the analysis of the network model, the efficiency indexes are given to evaluate the effectiveness of the CPS under data attack. The reasons why we choose these indexes in network and hyper-network model are also explained. Finally, the analysis in the case study illustrates that the method proposed is helpful for identifying critical elements of the CPS, which provides a new avenue for future vulnerability analysis research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are physical and engineered systems whose operations are monitored, coordinated, controlled and integrated by a computing and communication core [1] . Scholars and researchers believe that the combination of CPS and power systems is an important technical basis for the development of smart grids. In addition to descriptions from the infrastructure perspective [2] , [3] , several studies have focused on control and communication systems and their interaction with the physical system in a smart grid [4] - [6] . Tight coupling between cyber and physical systems introduces new security concerns [2] .
Several outages worldwide due to attacks on the cyber network of power systems have generated considerable recent research interest. Numerous experiments have established modeling methods and testbeds to study the security issues of CPS. Petri nets [7] , the bi-level model [8] , Markov games [9] and graph theory [10] have been used to model the security problems of CPS. A variety of factors, such as protection systems [11] and the attacker's total budget [8] , have been considered in the modeling processes. Several prominent CPS security testbeds are listed in [12] . The smart grid security testbed at Iowa State University, named PowerCyber testbed, is comprehensive [13] . It has been used to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of attacks on several cyber targets, such as Automatic Generation Control (AGC) [14] , Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) [15] , Wide-Area Protection systems [16] . However, PowerCyber testbed has not been used for research on Substation Auto System (SAS), which is the fundamental cyber and physical component of smart grid. Markov decision process is adopted to the model cyber-physical security problem for substations in power grid considering the competition between attacker and defender [17] , using a testbed built in [18] . This is useful to study the interactions between a complex power system and the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) system in a substation. A white box test based on internal structures is helpful for studying the mechanisms of offense and defense. There is still a need for a detailed modeling method of SAS according to common criteria in white box tests because implementing attacks on SAS is an effective means to affect the normal operations of power CPS. Ref. [19] proposes a cyber-physical interface matrix for reliability modeling and analyzing of modern substation protection systems based on IEC 618550, which embodies the characteristics of white box test. The definition of white box test from engineering science is contrary to black box test that can be seen only in terms of input and output without any knowledge of the internal workings. The finer-grained models are helpful to evaluate the attack profit and defense efficiency in CPS security white box experiments. Moreover, the game process between offence and defense will always exist in a centralized or distributed CPS. Therefore, the identification of critical elements is the main task in a vulnerability assessment, which is the focus of this paper.
Reference [10] proposes a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems and attacks from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives. Graph theory [20] and topology theory [21] , [22] are usually used to evaluate vulnerability, but there are problems with applying normal graph or topology theory to CPS analysis. One is that the heterogeneity of nodes cannot be described. Another is that ''system of systems'' or ''network of networks'' is difficult to define [23] . However, ''hyper-network'' is feasible for a network which has heterogeneous nodes and is a network of networks. Hyper-networks have been used as a tool in research on supply chains [24] - [26] and intelligent decision-making [27] , [28] by A. Nagurney. Additionally, hyper-networks have been used in biology [29] , the Internet of Things [30] , public crisis management [31] , military communication networks [32] , [33] , air defense systems [34] , and weapon system of systems [35] . In this paper, we present a novel SAS model based on hyper-network to identify the critical elements of the CPS according to IEC 61850.
Data attack is a common and direct way to cause an outage. It can be implemented in any procedure, such as data generation, communication, storage and application. Several studies have focused on data attack in CPS with respect to defense [36] and offense [37] , [38] . The Markov process [39] and semi-Markov process [40] have been used to model cyber data attacks. The precondition of our research is that data attacks are assumed to be successfully implemented. Thus, attack tools, procedures and typical methods are only introduced in Section II as Related Work. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section III presents some definitions of hypergragh, which are used in our work. Section IV illustrates the application of the hyper-network model to identify critical elements of a SAS according to IEC61850. Section V establishes a simple CPS model based on the model built in Section IV. The effectiveness evaluation method of a CPS under data attack is proposed, and the result analysis is provided in Section V. Finally, the conclusion and future research are proposed in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK A. CYBER OFFENSIVE TOOLS AND PROCEDURES
With the development of smart grid, increasingly more devices, such as IEDs, devices in ICTs and SCADA systems, are exposed to attacks by cyber offensive tools. The cyber attacks on power facilities are roughly defined as two stages: intruding target system and creating disruptive impacts [17] . However, a complete cyber attack process contains seven phases [41] , which are chronologically listed in TABLE 1. 
B. DATA ATTACK MODEL
By applying the tools listed in TABLE 1, a cyber attack can be implemented on SAS, Energy Manage System (EMS) and Market Management System (MMS) in smart grid. The data obtained by sensors in SAS are the foundation of data collection and calculations in SCADA system. SCADA telemetry data are fed into the state estimator (SE) module of EMS, where the SE module provides an estimate base power flow and network topology that is sent to the security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) module of MMS. The data in SAS resemble the information passing through the human nervous system, which helps to perceive the physical world and control behaviors. Data attacks on SAS alter the operational state and market clearing results of power system. Attack methods are not the focus of this paper. Data attacks on SAS are classified by their effects that refer to the classifications in electronic countermeasures (ECM). According to the attack impact, an attack can be divided into a data jamming attack or a data tampering attack. VOLUME 6, 2018 A data jamming attack seeks to make a device or network resource unavailable to users. For example, a denial of service (DoS) attack is a typical data jamming attack that is accomplished by flooding the targeted device or resource with superfluous requests in an attempt to overload systems and prevent some or all legitimate requests from being fulfilled [42] . Examples of a DoS attack are Ping of Death, UDP flood, and SYN flood. A TCP-SYN Flood, for instance, is an application layer DoS attack that takes advantage of TCP protocol vulnerabilities. It sends a large number of semiconnection requests to the target server by injecting false source addresses into messages and disenabling the ThreeWay Hand Shake between the target server and the node being attacked. This exhausts the target server resources and makes the server unable to answer normal connection requests. The impact of a power system under different data jamming attacks can be evaluated with building power and communication joint simulation platforms [12] .
A data tampering attack is an attempt to stealthily alter data for the purpose of deceiving bad data identification modules and causing misoperations. False data injection attack (FDIA) is a typical data tampering attack that makes the user believe that the altered data reflects the real system state. Here, the user represents the control center or logical node with computing functions. FDIA is an attack on the SE function, which is proposed by Liu et al. [43] ,
where z ∈ R m is the meter measurements vector, x ∈ R n represents system state variables, e ∈ R m is the Gaussian measurement noise, where e j ∼ N 0, σ 2 e , j = 1, 2, · · · , m, and
A SE based on a linear DC power flow model in EMS, for example, is used to find an estimatex of X, which is the best fit of the measurement z according to (2) ,
where H = h i,j m×n [43] . If the attacker is assumed to have the ability of controlling k meters, there can be a nonzero injected attack vector a = Hc and a 0 ≤ k. According to (3) , once the state vectors x and x+c are both valid in the DC power flow model, x is observationally equivalent to x+c for the control center. This implies that the injected attack vector a is unobservable and there is no detector that can distinguish x from x+c [44] .
In addition to numerous studies on the FDIA targeted at SE of a power grid, there have been studies that focus on the SE of a substation [45] - [47] and the corresponding FDIA methods [49] . Reference [48] studies the preconditions and the smallest attack cost of unobservable FDIAs on current and voltage sampling sequences from TCTR (Current Transformer) and TVTR (Voltage Transformer).
In this study, it is assumed that all the attacks on logical nodes are successful. Next, the impact on the CPS is analyzed after each logical node type fails to work properly under data attack.
III. DEFINITIONS OF A HYPERGRAPH A. HYPERGRAPH
Reference [49] lists ten important problems in network research. One of these problems is the ''network of networks'', that is, the problem of interaction between heterogeneous networks. Hyper-network methods should be considered when the nodes in the network are no longer homogeneous. The hypergraph was proposed by Berge in 1970 [50] . It is the most common way to model hypernetworks and is a tool for studying the influence of the interaction between networks [51] .
A hypergraph H is a pair H = (V , E) where
is a finite set of vertices, and E = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · .e m } is the set of the hypergraph's edges. e i is an edge of the hypergraph, which is a non-empty subset of V [50] , [52] .
B. INCIDENCE MATRIX OF THE HYPERGRAPH
A hypergraph can be represented by an incidence matrix I (H ). The columns in I (H ) correspond to the hyperedges e 1 , e 2 , · · · .e m respectively. The rows in I (H ) correspond to the vertices v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v n respectively. The entry b ij is defined in (6) .
C. ADJACENCY MATRIX OF THE HYPERGRAPH
If a hypergraph H is connected, its adjacency matrix A (H ) is symmetric, non-negative and irreducible [53] . The diagonal entries of A (H ) are zero, and the other entries are the number of hyper-edges that contain both vertices v i and v j . The entry a ij is defined in (7) and (8).
where
D. DEGREE CENTRALITY
Given a subset S ⊆ V , and a subset of the edge index set J ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , m}, the section hypergraph H Sec induced by S and J is defined as 
E. SUB-HYPERGRAPH CENTRALITY
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix A (H ) help to calculate the sub-hypergraph centrality. Let H = (V , E) be a simple hypergraph of order N . If v i ∈ V , then the sub-hypergraph centrality C SH (i) can be expressed as:
where A (H ) = UDU T , u ij are the entries of an orthogonal matrix U = u ij whose columns are the corresponding eigenvectors to the eigenvalues λ j , and the eigenvalues are the diagonal entries of
.
IV. HYPER-NETWORK MODEL OF SAS A. MODEL
The T1-1 transmission substation model in IEC 61850 has one incoming line and two outgoing lines. Although it has a simple structure, its protection scheme and associated control functions are in commonly used for other types of transmission substations. Fewer lines and equipment make it easy to extend this model to the logical nodes tier and to be depicted in a limited figure area. Therefore, a T1-1 small-size transmission substation is used as an example in this study. The functions of a T1-1 SAS are shown in the left part of Fig. 1 . Each function consists of multiple logical nodes (LNs). A logical node (LN) is a subfunction located in a physical node, which exchanges data with other separate logical entities. The links between logical nodes are listed in TABLE 2. The T1-1 substation has four bays: E01, E02, E03 and D01. The E01 and E03 are identical in structure and function. Using the distance protection in E03 as an example, the green rectangles in the red circle F6 are the logical nodes which participate in this function. In the right part of Fig. 1 , green rectangles represent logical nodes, blue ellipses represent the three levels that are listed in IHMI, ITCI, ITMI, PDIS, TCTR, TVTR and XCBR. The line distance protection starts and trips in cases when the changes in line impedance, admittance or reactance exceed the predefined limits [55] . The blue solid line between the logical nodes represents logical connections, which is the communication link between logical nodes. It is defined as an edge in a network model. According to [56] , only data contained in logical nodes can be exchanged. The purple dashed line represents the mapping of the logical node to the device.
In a normal network model, the connections between logical nodes are obvious, but the logical node's participation in different functions is difficult to show. A hyper-network model can clearly show this participation. In the hypernetwork model of SAS, a function which consists of a set of logical nodes is considered a hyper-edge. In this way, the logical node that participates in multiple functions is obvious. The incidence matrices and adjacency matrices in the network model and in the hyper-network model can be derived from TABLE 1. These matrices are used to calculate the centrality measures to identify the critical elements in an SAS.
At the station level, the CALH signals an alarm and warns the operator to take action. A RBRF is a breaker failure protection that is a back-up protection and is activated only when the main protection fails. Man-in-the-loop and back-up protection are not considered in this paper. Therefore, CALH and RBRF are not included in TABLES 2 and 3. 
B. TOPOLOGY ANALYSIS
General graphs cannot fully characterize some real world networks. While analyzing the T1-1 substation, the logical node must be attributed to the functions it participates in. This can be performed with a hyper-network model described above or a bipartite graph model in which logical nodes and functions are divided into two categories. However, only the connections between the two categories in a bipartite graph are shown. With a bipartite graph, analyzing connectivity, aggregation and other topological properties is difficult. It is mainly used to solve the maximum matching problem or perfect matching problem, which is not included in this study.
A hyper-graph, which can be described in terms of an analytic form has advantages. First, the matrix expression of hyper-graph can be easily processed with a computer. Second, the hyper-edge can be restructured in accordance with different requirements. This is an advantage for modeling reconfigurable systems. Finally, a matrix describes a snapshot of a fixed structure and a series of snapshots correspond to a series of moments. This makes it possible for a hyper-graph to simulate a time-varying system. However, there are also drawbacks, such as the neglect of connections between nodes. Moreover, some indices are difficult to comprehend intuitively or to extend from a general graph. Therefore, we choose typical indexes from general graph and we extend them to hyper-graph for a detailed analysis.
The heterogeneous logical nodes in an SAS network play different roles in structure and function. Identifying critical nodes is important because it helps with properly establishing the defense strategies of the SAS. Researchers in computer science and physics have studied critical node identification methods. Algorithms have been proposed and their criteria for identifying critical nodes are diverse. There does not exist a universal index suitable for every situation.
A comprehensive understanding of the similarities and dissimilarities in different methods can help us make the correct selection in application.
The network topological structure determines the influence of every node in it. The majority of existing critical node identification methods only use the structural information without considering the specific dynamic process. Structural centrality measures are proposed to evaluate the nodes' importance in terms of the structural information [57] . The influence of a node can be determined by its ability to impact others. Two categories of centrality measures, neighborhoodbased centralities and path-based centralities, are summarized in [57] . A straightforward measure called degree centrality is a typical neighborhood-based centrality, which is defined by counting the number of a node's immediate neighbors. According to degree centrality, the more neighbors a node has, the more critical it is. While considering the information propagation process, a node is more critical when the paths through it spread information faster and broader. These can be calculated by path-based centralities.
Identifying critical elements in the general logical function model of SAS according to IEC 61850 series is the research objective in this study. As mentioned above, it can be represented as an undirected and unweighted graph or a hyper-graph. LNs are nodes, the logical link between a pair of LNs is an edge, and a function is a hyper-edge. The simple parameters of the T1-1 network are listed in Table 4 . The T1-1 network is small because its number of nodes is 19. Its average degree centrality is far less than the number of nodes; thus, this network is sparse, like some technical networks. In this graph model, structural centralities help us to determine the LNs that are more critical. First, neighborhood-based centralities are discussed. Degree centrality is the simplest measure to evaluate a node's influence, which can be calculated by the number of its neighbors and is equal to the number of its connections. This measure is widely used because of its simplicity and good performance in some scenarios. For instance, attacks on nodes with a larger degree destroy the scale-free networks and exponential network more effectively than attack on nodes with other complicated indexes such as betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector centrality [58] . A frequency distribution histogram of the T1-1 network is similar to the Poisson distribution. It can resemble an exponential network where degree centrality can then be selected to analyze the importance of the nodes under data attack. In addition, LocalRank is a centrality measure which fully considers all the fourth-order neighbors of each node. It is not suitable for the T1-1 network because its characteristic path length is less than 3. ClusterRank considers both the nearest neighbors and the interactions among them [57] . However, it is defined in a directed network, rendering it unsuitable for the T1-1 network. Since the network diameter and radius are 5 and 3 respectively, the coreness values of all nodes are very small and indistinguishable. Therefore, a coreness measure is unsuitable as well.
Among path-based centralities, the eccentricity of a node is the maximum distance of all the shortest paths to the other nodes. Maximum indexes fail to evaluate the importance of nodes because it is affected by unusually long paths in a network model. Closeness centrality can be calculated by the inverse of the harmonic mean distances, rendering it easily affected by the extreme values, particularly the shortest path lengths. Unlike closeness centrality, Katz centrality is more comprehensive because it considers all the paths [57] , which increases its computational complexity. The subgraph centrality of a node is defined as a weighted sum of the numbers of all closed paths starting from and ending at it. Compared with the betweenness centrality of a node, which can be computed by counting all of the shortest paths passing through it, the subgraph centrality of a node is more suitable for this study because data attack on a closed loop information flows can easily confuse the LN.
In this study, degree centrality, which is a neighbor-based centrality, and subgraph centrality, which is a path-based centrality, are selected as the main indexes to identify the critical LNs in the T1-1 network model from a topological structure aspect. Additionally, they are able to be extended to hyper-graph easily and clearly defined in Section III. In Part C of Section IV, the comparative analysis of these centralities between a network model and hyper-network model is discussed.
C. CENTRALITY ANALYSIS
We use the concepts of degree centrality and sub-graph centrality, which have been extended to hypergraphs in [55] . These concepts describe the different node characteristics that enable the nodes to be ranked in the order of importance in the hyper-network. The first parameter indicates the participation of the node in different hyper-edges, and the second parameter characterizes the participation of the node in different subhypergraphs. In Fig. 2 the colored circles are logical nodes in T1-1, where the size of each circle represents a node's degree centrality and the color of each circle indicates its sub-graph centrality. The degree centralities of logical nodes in a network model and hyper-network model can be calculated by their corresponding incidence matrices and adjacent matrices.
In the hyper-network model, a logical node's degree centrality and sub-hypergraph centrality can be calculated by (10) and (11) respectively. In the network model, the degree centrality and subgraph centrality can also be calculated using (8) and (9), however, the incidence matrix I (H ) and adjacent matrix A (H ) should be replaced by the corresponding definitions of I (G) and A (G) in normal graph theory. The entry b G ij of I (G) is defined in (12) and the entry a G ij of A (G) is defined in (13) .
where e G j is an edge and E G is the set of edges in graph theory. Significant differences can be observed when comparing the rankings introduced both by different centrality measures and in different network models. First, we analyze the degree centrality. The degree centralities of logical nodes in the network model and hyper-network model can be calculated by the corresponding incidence matrices. The relative degree centralities in these models are plotted in Fig. 3 .
The top three most central nodes in the two models are identical. They are IHMI that represents human-machine interface action and data, TCTR that represents a current transformer's device and data, and TVTR that represents a voltage transformer's device and data. These three logical nodes are the most central ones and have more connections with other nodes; they appear most frequently in more functions represented as hyper-edges. These three logical nodes are the most vulnerable nodes based on the degree of centrality, and disabling one of them will exert a tremendous influence on the SAS.
The ranking of the other nodes in the hyper-network is different from the ranking in the network. For instance, ITCI is ranked as the fourth logical node in the hyper-network but does not appear among the top ten logical nodes in the network. This implies that although ITCI has fewer connections with other logical nodes, it appears in more hyper-edges that represent more different functions in the hyper-network. ITCI participates in 8 functions and has 2 connections with other logical nodes, whereas PDIS participates in only 3 functions even though it is ranked in the top three and has 5 connections with other logical nodes in the network model. The network model does not provide the number of functions in which a particular logical node participates. However, this information can be obtained directly from the hyper-network model. The degree in the hyper-network model corresponds to the number of functions in which a logical node participates. The node with a greater degree in the hyper-network plays an important role in the system operation because disabling such logical node through data jamming has a larger impact on the system and the deviation produced by data tampering with such logical node is spread to more functions. The second measure discussed here is the sub-graph centrality. As shown in Fig. 4 , there are significant differences in the ranking of the nodes' relative sub-hypergraph centrality compared with the relative sub-graph centrality calculated in the network model. PDIS is ranked as the most central node according to sub-hypergraph centrality, followed by ITMI and IHMI. ITMI is the second central node in the hypernetwork model but is not among the top five logical nodes in the network model, whereas PTDF exhibits the opposite trend.
PDIS, for example, has the maximum sub-hypergraph centrality, which implies that there are more closed walks of different lengths starting and ending at PDIS than at other logical nodes. The contribution of these closed walks decreases as the length of the walks increases in the derivation of (11) [54] . Therefore, PDIS's closed walks pass through more functions, and the influence of data attack aiming at PDIS will spread more quickly because PDIS has many shorter closed walks.
The functions, logical nodes and logical connections in Bay E03 are given in Fig. 5(a) , similarly for Bay E01. Fig. 5(b) shows the functions, logical nodes and logical connections in Bay E02 and D01. The greater the sub-hypergraph centrality of a logical node, the faster the influence of data attack aiming at it accumulates and spreads. The greater the degree centrality of a logical node in the hyper-network, the wider the range of direct influence it has after a data attack.
The degree and sub-graph centrality in a network model can only reflect the relationship between logical nodes. However, in the hyper-network model they express more functional information through a hyper-edge, which represents a set of logical nodes in the same function in this study.
V. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS A. A CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM MODEL
The hyper-network model of SAS is applied to build a CPS model. The physical system is the IEEE 14 Bus test power system. In a power system layout, a bus usually represents a substation. If a transformer is present between two buses, the assumption that the transformer and its associated buses are located in the same substation is reasonable. Therefore, the cyber system consists of 10 nodes and there are 11 nodes if the control center is included. The cyber topology is shown as the blue circles and lines in Fig. 6 . In each substation S/S k, the SAS consists of operating, protecting and monitoring functions. A function consists of subparts called logical nodes, which only exchange data with each other. In Fig. 6 , the layered chart in the left side represents the interlocking function in Bay E01. It consists of six logical nodes: IHMI, ITCI CILO, CSWI, XCBR, and XSWI, which are defined in the IEC 61850 series.
B. EVALUATION METHODS OF EFFICIENCY AND DAMAGE
A logical node that is suffering from data jamming can not work effectively. When it is not working, the node and its associated logical connections are deleted from the network model and hyper-network model. If a logical node is suffering from data tampering, deviations will spread across the network via logical connections. The evolution of the SAS models under data attack can be observed in Fig. 5 and the IEC 61850 series. For example, when PDIS is under a data jamming attack, it cannot send data to XCBR in time. The circuit breaker rejects actions and the power line is not promptly disconnected. When PDIS is under a data tampering attack, it sends data to XCBR by error and the misoperation of the circuit breaker can occur.
The consequences of a data attack can be evaluated by the effectiveness indexes of SAS. There are two effectiveness indexes of SAS that are defined below according to attack scenarios. The first index is link efficiency E Link (S/S k ), which is used to assess the data link working efficiency of substation k's after a data jamming attack on its logical node n. It mainly considers the remaining logical connections between the two layers. where e initial ij is an entry of the initial adjacency matrix in the network model and e n ij is an entry of the adjacency matrix in the network model after logical node n is attacked. G S , G B and G P are the subscripts set of the logical nodes in the substation level, bay level and process level, respectively. The attributes of the levels of the logical nodes are listed in TABLE 3. N Level is the number of levels. The second index is function efficiency E Function (S/S k ), which can be used to assess the function realization efficiency of substation k after a data tampering attack on its logical node n. It is defined by the number of functions involved in the closed walks that start and end at logical node n.
where C SH (n) is the sub-hypergraph centrality of logical node n and N LN is the number of logical nodes in substation k.
The integrated efficiency of the SAS of substation k can be defined in (16) . It considers the connections between the logical nodes in the network model and the functional influence in the hyper-network model. Calculate initial efficiency of each substation E (S/S k ) Before ; 6: end for 7: Calculate initial power system load P Load_Before ; 8:
for n ←0 to N LN − 1 do 9:
for k ←0 to N S/S − 1 do 10:
Do data link evolution after data attack on logical node n in S/S k ; / * Algorithm 2 * / 11:
Calculate the effectiveness of substation kE (S/S k ) After after data attack; 12: end for 13: end for 14: Calculate E n (CS), E n (PS)and D n (CPS); 15: Output n, E n (CS), E n (PS) and D n (CPS);
where α = 0.5 is assumed here. If the number of substations in the cyber system is N S/S , then the efficiency of the entire cyber system can be calculated by (17) .
If there is only data jamming on the logical node n, it is deleted from the model. Deleting a logical node has no influence on functions sometimes, such as IARC. If there is only data tampering on the logical node n, it continues to work and its logical connections are not deleted from the model, and its data links also continue to work. This integrated efficiency index E (CS) is applicable even when composite data attack mode appears in the cyber system. The composite attack mode is frequently used in current military electronic warfare.
Once the logical nodes in the process level, such as XCBR and XSWI, are affected by a data attack, the corresponding power line in the physical system is disconnected. The damage to the entire CPS should take load loss into consideration, which is defined as the normalized efficiency loss.
where E (PS) = P Load_After /P Load_Before is the load supply efficiency of the power system. Effectiveness of the CPS after a data attack on each logical node type in some SASs is evaluated as the pseudo-code of Algorithm 1 presented below. A core step in Algorithm 1 is shown in Algorithm 2.
C. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We analyze the effectiveness of the CPS after data attacks on each individual logical node of substation S/S1 shown in Fig. 6 . Taking PDIS as an example, the data jamming attack on PDIS can force its next logical node XCBR to refuse operation for the distance protection function. This refusal of operation for XCBR can cause a line overload. Then the line may fail to work. A data tampering attack on PDIS can make its next logical node XCBR misoperate with the distance protection function. This misoperation of XCBR can make the line quit. TABLE 4 shows that when PDIS is attacked, the integrated efficiency of S/S1 is the lowest. The analysis of the physical system indicates that when PDISs in S/S1 are attacked, the influence can arrive at XCBRs in a walk, causing the three lines to quit and the generator GEN 1 to be cut. The attacks on PDISs have the greatest impact on the S/S1 in the shortest time. IHMI is allocated at the station level, taking part in every function of the SAS because it has hyper-degree of 12. However, the walks of its messages to the logical nodes in the process level is greater than those of PDIS. The IEEE 14 Bus test power system is designed to VOLUME 6, 2018 TABLE 5. The efficiencies when each logical node in S/S 1 is attacked.
FIGURE 7.
The effectiveness indexes after data attack on a logical node in S/S1 and S/S2.
have a large redundant capacity. Therefore, if the three lines in S/S1 quit, it will not affect the power system's load supply efficiency E (PS) = 1, and the damage to the CPS remains zero with D (CPS) = 0.
In TABLE 5 , there are differences when the logical nodes are sorted in descending order of E Link (S/S k ) and E (S/S k ). This is because the E Link (S/S k ) column only considers the connections between logical nodes, and the E (S/S k ) column considers the f unctional influence on the hyper-network model.
If we want E (PS) = 1, which implies that there is load loss in the power system, we must design the composite data attack strategies to target e ach type of logical nodes in the multiple substations or the control center. For example, when the PDISs in substation S/S1 and S/S2 are under data attack, there will be 21.7MW load loss in the power system and the damage of the CPS is 6.9% as shown in Fig. 7 . When the PDISs in substation S/S1, S/S2 and S/S3 are under data attack, there will be 94.2MW load loss in the power system and the damage of the CPS is 33.8% as shown in Fig. 8 . In future studies we will consider protection measures such as firewalls and gateways, and the evaluation process will be an offence and defense game.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces the concept of a hyper-network to model a CPS according to IEC 61850. Considering the complexity of the cyber and physical interaction, extended centrality measurements in hypergraph are used to identify the critical elements in CPS. An effectiveness evaluation method of CPS after data attack is proposed in this work. This method considers not only the influence on connections between logical nodes, but also the functional influence and load loss after data attack. This work is helpful for guiding the white box experiments of defense technology against data attacks. This paper only analyzes the impact of attacks on one logical node type (in a station or in several stations). More complex composite data attack strategies targeting multiple logical node types will be studied in the future. The game model in which a successful attack action is considered as a probabilistic event related to offense and defense measures can also be established in future research.
